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ABSTRACT 
 
Reverse Auction Bidding is for the purchase of goods or services that has 
developed in line with the development of the World Wide Web. A number of agencies 
utilize Reverse Auction Bidding as their procurement tool. In an RAB, human bidders 
bid against each other by reduce their bid price.  
It is believed the computer bidder machine can be introduced into reverse auction 
bidding to compete against human beings. However, the reaction time of a computer 
machine is much faster than a human. This research is looking to develop  the algorithm 
for the computer machine to follow, so that when the computer is bidding against a 
human being, people cannot determine that it is a machine bidding in the game. 
This research is the 26th case study of Reverse Auction Bidding in Texas A&M 
University, Construction Science department. The research has analyzed the existing 
data which collected from previous RAB experiments. The results show two rules can be 
setup for computer bidder machines. Rule 1, when the computer is bidding during the 
segment 1 of each section, it shall randomly select from 2 seconds to 23 seconds as its 
time-intervals. Rule 2, when the computer is bidding during the segment 2 of each 
section, it shall randomly select from 2 seconds to 9 seconds as its time-intervals.  
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
RAB  Reverse Auction Bidding 
KTS  Keirsey Temperament Sorter 
ASP  Application Service Provider 
SQL  Sequential Query Language 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
Background 
Reverse Auction Bidding is for the purchase of goods or services that has 
developed in line with the development of the World Wide Web. The system relies on a 
central server and database being used to accept bids for the required contracts. A number 
of private agencies and governments now require Reverse Auction Bidding (RAB) as their 
procurement methods in construction projects (Yuan, 2013). However, there are still many 
challenges for some is using (Angelo, 2002; Caniëls & van Raaij, 2009). These challenges 
are whether or not RAB is economically efficient, whether the system is akin to bid 
shopping and is the system inherently fair to both sides of the contract.  
The traditional bidding method, such as closed sealed bid, allows the bidders to 
submit their prices only once during the bidding time, where RAB has multiple bids for 
a single contract. RAB uses an online tool that enables the bidders to lower their prices 
several times during the bidding period, the lowest bidder would be awarded the bid 
(Angelo, 2002). Human bidders compete against each other. The bidder may lower an 
existing bid from another player.  
Human bidders are relatively slow when compared to a computer, there is the 
same ratio between a second and a nanosecond as there is between 31 years and a 
second. Computers can look at many aspects of bidding in the time a human player can 
merely read the current bids. This has resulted in the phenomenal known as flash trading 
on the stock market (Hasbrouck & Saar, 2013; Manahov, Hudson, & Gebka, 2014).  
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Problem Statement 
The research will seek and identify the statistical properties of time-intervals of 
human bidders in Reverse Auction Bidding to plan the algorithm of a computer bidder 
machine in Reverse Auction Bidding.  
Research Questions 
The intent of the research is to seek the properties of a computer algorithm that 
does not appear to be a computer based procedure, but plays at human time rate. The 
relevant questions are: 
i. What are the time-intervals between bids and patterns for a human bidder? 
ii. How to establish the time intervals for a computer bidder so that the human 
bidders do not realize that they are competing against a machine instead of 
human? 
iii. What algorithm will the computer machine follow? 
Significance of the Study 
The bid time intervals for a computer bidder machine can be established based on 
the result of this study. In addition, human bidders’ reactions when competing against 
the machine can be analyzed in further studies. To construct a computer bidder machine 
without making other human bidders realize that they are competing to a machine will 
be the optimal goal of this serial of research. Thus, this research helps to further 
understand human bidders’ behavior in Reverse Auction Bids, which enables introduce a 
human intelligence program into RAB transactions.  
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i. The study is limited to the Department of Construction Science, Texas 
A&M University. The scope of participants is limited to graduate students 
of the Construction Science Department.  
ii. A controlled experiment by other research people in the Construction 
Science Department.  
iii. The study ignores all clerical mistakes of the bidders. For example, mis-
input a number or a digit when entering a bid. 
iv. The reverse auction experiment was carried out in a stable economic 
situation,   and there was no other factors influence the bidder’s decisions. 
  
Delimitations 
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Since Reverse Auction Bidding is been utilized in the industrial world from 
1990s, a lot of research and studies have been conducted. However, arguments and 
acceptance of Reverse Auction Bidding are ongoing. Researchers have paid a lot of 
attention to the characteristics of Reverse Auction Bidding itself. However, less research 
has been done on the bidders’ behavior and performance in RAB.  
This chapter outlines a summary of: 
 Definitions  
 English Auction 
 Dutch Auction 
 Sealed First Proposal Auction 
 Vickrey Auction 
 Reverse Auction 
 Reverse Auction Bidding Procedures 
 Buyers and Purchasers’ Relationship 
 Human Intelligent Computer Program in Financial Trades 
 Previous Studies of RAB in Texas A&M University 
 Personality Test 
 The Review of RAB system in TAMU 
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Definitions  
λ player This represents the bidder group, treated as a single 
entity for the purpose of game analysis. 
λi player The ith bidder in the bidding group. 
υ player This represents the purchaser. 
α game The postulated sub-game played between bidders in 
seeking economic advantage over the remaining bidders. 
This game almost always disadvantages the υ player, but 
the υ player created the system and so is responsible for 
the υ player’s economic losses as a result. 
ω game The postulated sub-game played within the Reverse 
Auction Bidding game between the purchaser and the 
bidders. In terms of this analysis, it is deemed to 
effectively reduce to a two-player game, with 
competition implications for all players. The υ player in 
reality sees only the average of all won bids. 
τ Bid time allowed for each round of play in the game. 
δ Period between bid time τ that represents the work time 
in the game. 
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Bj ith bid 
Bv Accepted bid for each job. 
K This variable is a fixed dollar sum, representing the υ 
player’s base price, although in this game K is a vector 
of costs.  
Γ This variable is a fixed dollar sum, representing the υ 
player’s maximum incremental price above K. 
Ξ This variable is normally defined by the set of numbers     
{Ξ| 0˂ Ξ ≤ 1}, although negative values of Ξ are 
permitted by the Reverse Auction Bidding system. Ξ is 
used to normalize the profit data. A negative Ξj 
represents a loss on direct costs to the λi player who 
makes this type of bid, and enough of these bids will 
lead to a bankrupt player. This type of play is 
discouraged as the assumption in the game is steady state 
economic conditions in the outside economy. Future 
studies may look at a failing market, but that is beyond 
this study. 
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Aggressive Bidder: Willing to accept calculated risk of greater than average 
loss in pursuit of greater than average returns, first 
defined by Chouhan (2009). 
Bid: A single entry into the game that represents a legally 
acceptable offer to complete the work assuming the 
bidder has been prequalified. 
Bidder: An entity that submits a bid. In this game, there are 
usually three to ten bidders, and each is an individual, 
rather than a company. In van Vleet’s (2004) study, none 
of the bidders had prior experience, which is not true for 
Chouhan’s (2009) study. 
Bid Efficiency: Is the ratio of the total number of jobs won to the total 
number of bids. This is one of the postulated metrics for 
determining success in the α game. 
Case Study: ‘Designed to study intensely one set (or unit) of 
something; for e.g. programs, cities, counties, worksites-
as a distinct whole, with the goal of understanding the 
set as a distinct whole in its particular context. A case 
study reveals the process and outcome at certain sites 
and the way in which these interrelate. Case studies are 
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conducted primarily using qualitative techniques, but do 
not exclude quantitative data (van Vleet 2004)’. 
Dutch Auction: is a type of auction where the auctioneer begins with a 
high asking price which is lowered until some 
participant is willing to accept the auctioneer's price, or a 
predetermined reserve price (the seller's minimum 
acceptable price) is reached (van Vleet 2004). 
Efficiency: The ratio of the output to the input of any system. 
Game: A series of jobs for the construction of a reinforced 
concrete floor slab, each game lasts approximately 8 to 
10 weeks in game play time, with each round of the 
game modeling a week and occurring in a 20 minute 
period, with 15 minutes of bid time and 5 minutes of 
build time. 
Game theory: A formal analysis of conflict and cooperation among 
intelligent and rational decision makers. 
Job: A work unit, in this case a reinforced concrete slab for a 
home builder, taking 5 working days to construct. 
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Loan amount: It is a bank loan or a guarantee taken by the bidder with 
the purpose of increasing the bidders’ job capacity. The 
cost is $500 per job. 
Loss: Negative return applied to a business undertaking after 
all operating expenses have been met. 
Profit: The return received on a business undertaking after all 
operating expenses have been met. 
Reverse Auction Bidding: It is a single or multiple-item, open, descending-price 
auction. The initiator specifies the opening bid price and 
bid decrement. Each bidder submits a successively lower 
bid. At the end of the auction, the bidder with lowest bid 
value is being considered as a winner (van Vleet 2004). 
Sealed Bidding: In this type of auction, all bidders simultaneously submit 
bids in such a way that no bidder knows the bid of any 
other participant. The highest/lowest bidder is awarded 
the contract at an agreed price, all other things being 
equal .(van Vleet 2004). 
Traditional bidding: In this type of auction all bidders simultaneously submit 
bids in such a way that no bidder knows the bid of any 
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other participant. The highest/lowest bidder is assumed 
to be awarded at the price submitted provided no other 
contracts opened on the decision process (Chaudary 
2009). 
Winners Curse: Problem faced by uninformed bidders or poor game 
players. For example, in an initial public offering 
uninformed participants are likely to purchase larger 
allotments of issues that informed participants know are 
overpriced. 
 
Game Type: 
Consider a Reverse Auction Bidding game where the υ player is willing to accept 
bids of the type shown in equation (1): 
                                                           Bj = K + Ξj Γ,                                                        (1) 
Γ represents the upper limit the υ player is prepared to pay in the game above the 
nominal minimum bid amount K. A negative Ξj represents a loss on direct costs to the λi 
player who makes this type of bid, and enough of these bids will lead to a bankrupt 
player (Guhya 2010). The concept of Γ can be attributed to Feigenbaum (Nichols 2010), 
who considered there had to be an upper limit everyone was prepared to pay for a 
service or good, the so called price point of economic theory. 
The bidding period for each game lasts for a set time, τ, in this case it is 15 
minutes. The total cost for υ player is shown in equation (2): 
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                                                       𝐵𝑣 =∑ 𝐵𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
,                                                          (2) 
This total cost is based on the accepted lowest bid for each job, where the 𝜆𝑖 
player submitted a valid bid for a job. Each 𝜆𝑖  player then has a unique set of bids and a 
unique set of jobs, with a total return to the 𝜆𝑖  player defined by a simple summation 
(Guhya 2010). In terms of the υ player, the average cost per job and the total cost are the 
main elements. The lowest and highest costs are of interest, but the υ player’s clear 
objective must be to lower the average price. This is not necessarily the key objective of 
the other players. 
English Auction 
English Auction was known as candle auction which becomes popular in 17th 
century in England. Candle auction sets up its period based on the expiration of a candle 
flame all the participants do not know the exact auction period. The candle auction helps 
eliminates the auction spinning, because nobody knows exactly when the auction will 
ends, which helps to eliminate the spinners to enter into the auction in the last seconds. 
However, it went out of favor in 18th century. 
An English Auction is the traditional type of auction that sells scarce goods or 
services. For example, artwork or antiques. Different from rouge materials, in name of 
concrete, woods, steels, that can duplicate in a short time and a great quantity. The 
scarce goods are unique from others. Even to reproduce an antique becomes technically 
possible now days, the value of a duplicated product is less than the real one. English 
auction is derived from the economic characters of scarce goods.  
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In the English Auctions, the buyers are competing against each other by rising 
their bid prices. The bid prices will increase until only one bidder remains in a given 
time frame. Whether bids are submitted online or call their prices, the transparent 
auction process makes the buyers know current highest price. So that they can choose to 
raise their prices or remain the same with the changes of their bidding strategy. 
At the end of English Auction, the auctioneer will announce the winner who 
provides the highest price in a given time frame.  
Dutch Auction 
Dutch auction was first adopted in Dutch tulip market in 16th century, when the 
tulip price was extremely high. Because the long growing period of tulip makes it hard 
to meet the high demand of the market, in addition, tulip can be traded in the market for 
only three months. The sellers will sign the contract with tulip purchasers during the year 
to deliver the flower in a given time.  
In order to achieve as many benefits as possible, the tulip sellers have set up the 
rules of an auction. The seller will announce an artificial high price where nobody wants 
to buy the product; she will reduce her prices constantly until the first buyer accepts the 
price and the auction end at the point. The Dutch auction will be terminated in a fast 
pace. It is beneficial for both purchasers and sellers since it is very hard to predict the 
real price of the tulip, where the demand meets supply. The tulip sellers can sell their 
flowers immediately without considering their contract been canceled. Simultaneously, 
the purchaser can buy tulip at the price, which is acceptable to them. The Dutch auction 
still is a powerful tool for purchasers to procure bulk amount of goods.  
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Sealed First-Price Auction 
Sealed first-price auction is different from the English Auction that allows all the 
bidders to submit their bid price only once. Before the bid opening, bidders do not know 
other competitors’ bid price. As this auction does not allow the bidders to disclose their 
prices, the bidders cannot adjust their prices accordingly (McAfee, Dinesh Satam, 1987). 
The bid will be awarded to the one who provide the highest price (Krishna 2002).  
Three uncertainty conditions may result to the winner’s curse in sealed first-price 
auction. (Warren J.2009) Firstly, the bidders may have a poor understanding of the 
information that they receive. Secondly, bidders may interpret in the auction requirement 
differently. Thirdly, the evaluation of the product is subjective and uncertain. The 
winning bidder is the one who provide the highest price. However, this price may exceed 
the true value of the product. This situation results in a cursed winner.  
It is suggested there are some implications for the bidder. For example, the 
bidders could be less aggressive in an auction, and they should know as much about the 
contract requirement as they can collect so that a more accurate price can be estimated 
before they enter into the auction. In addition, do not bid when the true value of the 
product is not fully known.  
The sealed first bid auction is popular among the government mining contracts. It 
is also been utilized in some of the UK construction projects. (Shu Yuan 2013).  
Vickrey Auction 
Firstly described by William Vickrey, the professor in Columbia University in 
1961, (Vickrey Wulliam, 1961). Vickrey Auction is a type of auction that the bidders 
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submit their written bid without known other bidders’ prices. The highest bidder will 
win the auction, but she only pays the second-highest bid price.  
Vickrey Auction is similar to an English Auction, but by awarded the contract to 
the second-highest bidder, the bidders are encouraged to provide the true value in an 
auction. Vickrey Auction has been studied in the literature, but not many Vickrey 
Auction are been done in the real world practice. Google and Yahoo!’s online 
advertisement programs have utilized Vickrey Auction. (Hal R. Varian, 2006) 
Compared to a traditional English Auction, the drawbacks of Vickrey auction are 
obvious. Firstly, the Vickrey Auction does not allow the bidders to explore the true value 
of goods by observe other bidders’ prices. Secondly, sellers may intend to bid a higher 
price to increase the profit.  Thirdly, it is vulnerable to bidder collusion, even bidder 
collusion is a problem for all types of auctions, and the bidders can lower their price, by 
revealing their bids to each other in Vickrey Auction.  
Reverse Auction 
Reverse Auction bidding is a type of process where the buyers and sellers roles 
are reversed. In the traditional type of auction, buyers compete to achieve goods by 
increasing their prices. In a reverse auction, the sellers compete to obtain the business by 
lowering their prices.  
Reverse auction is also known as Procurement auction, e-auction, sourcing event 
or B2B auction. It is mostly used in government procurement.  
Reverse Auction Bidding Procedures 
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Reverse Auction Bidding is an e-commerce transaction. An online trusted third 
party is essential, which provides a platform for the purchasers and sellers to conduct 
their businesses (Srinath, Samrat, & Mamata J., 2011). Different from sealed bidding 
process, the bidders can know the ranks of their prices and decide whether to bid a lower 
price or remain the same. Bidders can reduce their prices during the entire period of 
bidding time. In successful reverse auction bidding, 5 phases are required (see Figure 1)  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Reverse Auction Bidding Procedure 
 
 
 
The first phase is that purchasers have to clarify the specifications and 
requirements of products and services, as they need. Similarly, to a sealed bidding 
process, the purchasers have to provide drawings and specifications of works or 
descriptions of the materials they want to buy. The cleaner the description provided by 
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the purchaser, the more likely a reverse auction bidding is going be successful (Srinath et 
al., 2011).  
The second phase is that purchasers have to find a third trusted party who 
provides the service for purchasers and sellers to create the bidding rules. Purchasers can 
pre-select the bidders based on bidders’ previous performance, the qualities of products, 
reputations and their capacities to provide products and services. Carefully evaluate the 
bidder’s qualification and set up the bidding rules is important for both the purchasers 
and bidders to eliminate economic loss in reverse auction bidding. 
Communicate with and train the bidders is the third phase of the auction. 
Purchasers need to be sure that the bidders understand how to access the screen and 
know how to conduct the bidding in the system. In addition, the purchaser can reduce the 
potential economic loss by given a good training program to the sellers. A good training 
program ensures the sellers understand the bidding rules which are established by the 
purchaser before conduct RAB. 
The fourth phase is to conduct the auction. The bidders run the auction for a 
certain period, prices or the rank of bidders will be provided to every participant. 
The last phase is to award the bid to the successful bidder. Bids do not 
necessarily always need to be awarded to the lowest bidder. The purchaser can make the 
decision that to finalize the bid to which bidder based on multi-attribute evaluations of 
the participants. However, the transaction needs to be terminated after the bid closing 
time.  
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There is an intense debate about utilizing Reverse Auction Bidding in the 
construction industry. Some argue that reverse auction bidding is nothing more than 
“bid-shopping”. In addition, the objectors advocate that reverse auction bidding could 
reduce the quality of products and leave negative impacts of buyer-supplier relationships 
(Angelo, 2002). Further, there is no evidence to indicate the prices have been 
dramatically reduced by adopting reverse auction bidding in construction projects 
(Guhya, 2010).  
To compare the reverse auction bidding price of a contract with the contract that 
is awarded by sealed-bidding process is impossible (Guhya, 2010). 
Buyers and Purchasers’ Relationship 
Transactions are categorized as transactional exchange and relational exchange. 
(Daly, Sp, 2005). The transactional exchange is a type of business where the buyers and 
suppliers only pursue profits but do not try to establish a long-term relationship with 
each other. To the contrary, the relational exchange considers a long-term corporation 
between buyers and sellers as an important factor in doing business. It is believed 
Reverse Auction Bidding is a transactional exchange, where the price is the only critical 
factor. In this situation, buyers rarely consider suppliers as their strategic partners.  
In addition, Manoochehri claims that once the main goal of buyers is to focus on 
price reduction, the strategic relationship will be eliminated (Manoochehri G. & Lindsy 
C., 2008). Further, from the bidders’ prospect, the overall satisfaction of buyer-
supplier’s relationship will be decreased if there are too many bidders in RAB. the 
balance between competition needs to be maintained. The statistic data reveals that the 
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satisfaction increase as the number of bidder increase to 12 bidders per RAB and drops 
once the number exceed it (Jap, 2007). It is possible that bidders lose their interest and 
refuse to bid against the aggressive bidders in RAB. 
However, Jap (2007) argues that the benefits of suppliers by using RAB are not 
neglect. Reverse auction bidding can reduce the complexity of bidding process since the 
RAB utilizes the internet, and the submission of bids are through online tools in a given 
time frame with an exact transaction. As long as the winner has been selected, the 
supplier can rapidly execute contracts so that they eliminate the time waste due a 
protected contract awarding process compare to traditional bidding. Further, a 
transparency bidding process makes the suppliers clearly understand the mechanism of 
winner selection procedure, which is fairer than an opaque sealed bid transaction. 
In order to resolve the hazardous of buyer-supplier’s relationship brought by 
reverse auction bidding, several solutions are proposed. One of the most prevalent 
research topics of RAB is that to adopt multi-attribute reverse auction bidding instead of 
considering price reduction as the only factor to evaluate the suppliers. Multi-attribute 
RAB enables buyers to evaluate the supplier’s comprehensive capacity of providing the 
goods or services. In multi-attribute RAB, buyers qualify the suppliers based suppliers’ 
previous experiences, the qualities of products and suppliers’ financial statements. The 
mechanism of selecting a winner becomes comprehensive. Since other factors are 
introduced into RAB of selecting the winner, suppliers’ concern about the buyer’s 
opportunism can be reduced.  
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Experiments on human’s reaction time have been studied for over a century. 
Kosinski (2012) developed a comprehensive literature review on human being’s reaction 
time. Three major categories of reaction time experiments were conducted, which are 
simple reaction experiment, recognition reaction time experiment, and choice reaction 
experiment. The mean of human being’s simple reaction time is 200 millisecond. The 
more complex the experiment was, the longer the participant’s reaction time was tested. 
Some other factors have been studied and analyzed by the series experiment of reaction 
time. However, human being’s average reaction time is much longer than a computer’s. 
In an RAB, the time of collecting information (receive the declined price on 
screen), analyze the information (comparing other bidder’s prices) and react to the 
information (whether to reduce one’s own price or not) consists a human bidder’s 
reaction time. Hasbrouck (2013) addressed, “a faster speed than any other traders 
enables the prompt response to news or market activity” which can determine a trader’s 
profit pattern. 
Genetic programming is a human intelligent computer program which has been 
utilized in the foreign exchange and stock market. As an artificial tool, computer 
program can mimic the human traders’ decision-making and behaviors in the 
equilibrium selections in a trade market ( Manahov, 2013). Some people argue that the 
application of computer programs in trading market improved the trading frequency, 
which may have negative impacts on the market efficiency. The example is given that 
Human Intelligent Computer Program in Financial Trades 
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However, both Hasbrouck and Manahov analyzed NASDAQ order-level data and 
concluded that high-frequency trading has a positive impact on market quality. 
No matter how people argue about the influences of utilizing a computer 
program in trading market, the application of genetic programming is a release of 
manpower. 
Previous Studies of RAB in Texas A&M University 
A series of research of reverse auction bidding are being undertaken in Texas 
A&M University Construction Science department. The reverse auction bidding game 
was designed by Van Vleet in 2004. Students and industrial professions were invited to 
participate the experiment. Chouhan (2009) collected the personality type of participants 
according to Keirsey Temperament Sorter. Saigaonkar (2010) analyzed the impact the 
personality type and data; they further revealed that there are three personality types in 
the controlled game and suggested the Guardians have a better perform. 
Chaudhari (2009) extended the RAB research of the owner’s interference in 
reverse auction bidding. This research showed the negative impact that owner 
interference had on the relationship between the bidders. Further, Yuan Shu (2013) 
conducted the bid arrivals analysis to help further understand “early bidding” and “bid 
snipping” phenomenon. Discovered by Shmueli’s eBay bid arrivals research (Shmueli et 
al., 2004), Shu tested whether the bid arrivals follows a Poisson process. Her work is 
based on the data collected from previous TAMU RAB experiments. 
NASDAQ has experienced many losses due to the trading programming being unable to 
handle the order submission and cancelations generated by high-frequency trades. 
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Originally proposed by Rogers (2010), the Keirsey Temperament Sorter Test was 
the tool to be utilized to find out the differences in personality between a Type   and
Type  types (Yuan Shu, 2013).  71 questions were included in the Keirsey
Temperament Sorter Test, which identifies 16 types of personalities.  Chouhan (2009) 
used the Keirsey Temperament Sorter test to test the personality types of the bidder in an 
RAB. The personality types are categorized as SP – The Artisans, NT – The Rationals, 
NF- The idealists and SJ – The Guardians. 
The Table 1 summarized the Keisey temperament sorter test. The Table 2 shows 
the individual components in the temperament scale. (Yuan Shu, 2013). 
The personality type has an impact on the return in RAB (Gupta, 2010).  
Previous research shows generally that the Guardian has the best bidding performance in 
comparison to other personality types. (Kumar, 2014).  However, the complexity of 
personality cannot be neglected. In 2013, Piper has conducted an RAB game, his 
research indicated an Idealist has rewarded the highest profit return who has beaten other 
three guardians. Further studies need to be completed on personality impact in RAB. 
Personality Test 
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Table 1 
Keirsey Temperaments 
  Temperament Role Role Variant 
Introspective 
(N) 
 
Idealist (NF) 
Diplomatic 
Mentor (NFJ) 
Developing 
Teacher (ENFJ): Educating 
 Counselor (INFJ): Guiding 
 Advocate (NFP) 
Mediating 
Champion (ENFP): 
Motivating  Healer (INFP): Conciliating 
 
Rational 
(NT) 
Strategic 
Coordinator 
(NTJ) 
Arranging 
Field marshal (ENTJ): 
Mobilizing  astermind (INTJ): 
Entailing  Engineer (NTP) 
Constructing 
Inventor (ENTP): Devising 
 Architect (INTP): Designing 
Observant 
(S) 
 
Guardian 
(SJ) 
Logistical 
Administrator 
(STJ) 
Regulating 
Supervisor (ESTJ): Enforcing 
 Inspector (ISTJ): Certifying 
 Conservator 
(SFJ) 
Supporting 
Provider (ESFJ): Supplying 
 Protector (ISFJ): Securing 
 
Artisan (SP) 
Tactical 
Operator (STP) 
Expediting 
Promoter (ESTP): 
Persuading  Crafter (ISTP): Instrumenting 
 Entertainer 
(SFP) 
Improvising 
Performer (ESFP): 
Demonstrating  Co poser (ISFP): 
Synthesizing  
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Table 2 
Personality Type Summary 
# Name Meaning 
E Extraversion Feel motivated by interaction with people. Tend to enjoy a wide 
circle of acquaintances, and gain energy in social situations 
N Intuition More abstract than concrete. Focus attention on the big picture 
rather than the details, and on future possibilities rather than 
immediate realities 
F Feeling Value personal considerations above objective criteria. In making 
decisions, often give more weight to social implications than to 
logic 
J Judgment Plan activities and make decisions early. Derive a sense of control 
through predictability 
I Introversion Quiet and reserved. Generally prefer interacting with a few close 
friends rather than a wide circle of acquaintances, and expend 
energy in social situations 
P Perception Withhold judgment and delay important decisions, preferring to 
"keep their options open" should circumstances change 
T Thinking Value objective criteria above personal preference. When making 
decisions, generally give more weight to logic than to social 
considerations 
S Sensing More concrete than abstract. Focus attention on the details rather 
than the big picture, and on immediate realities rather than future 
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The Review of RAB system in TAMU 
Van Vleet (2004) has developed a website which uses ASP program to simulate 
the RAB process. This website utilized Microsoft SQL Server to collect the bids and 
record the bidding time.  
The RAB game rules were set up by Van Vleet, the specific rules are: 
i. The duration of the game were nine consecutive weeks (Kumar, 2014). 
ii. The costs for every job were estimated as $10,000. This price does not 
include the travel expenses and delivery costs. The values of travel and 
delivery costs are variable which are given based on the jobsite locations.  
iii. Each bidder has $40,000 at the beginning of the game so that they can bid 
on three jobs. But if the bidder decided to bid on more than three jobs, they 
have to take a loan from the bank. The charge for each loan is $500.  
iv. It is assumed the job can be completed by five days. However, this schedule 
does not include the rain delay. In order to create a realistic game 
environment, the rain delays are considered as well.  
v. Since the estimated cost for all jobs is $10,000, and the duration is five 
days, so that each day, the job will cost $2000. Travel costs and delivery 
expenditures will be added on a daily basis in accordance with the job site 
location.  
vi. It is assumed the project owner are located at Sugar Land, Texas. The travel 
and delivery costs are calculated based on the distances between each job 
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site and the owner’s site. In addition, it is assumed the subcontractors are 
located in the Sugar Land, Texas. 
vii. The work will be paid at the completion of fifth construction day. 
Rain Delay  
A realistic game environment can generate a better result of the experiment 
which helps people to understand the human’s reaction in RAB game. The game rule 
was set up by Van Vleet. It assumed the RAB game occurs during May to July in 
Houston, where has high rainfall period from May to July. Based on National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 2010) data, which describes the probability of 
rain in Houston from May to July. The Figure 2 indicates the rain distribution.  
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Figure 2 The Rain Probability 
 
 
 
If jobs experience rain delay, they will be considered as incomplete job. Rain 
delays will influence the bidding process by increasing the travel costs and delivery 
costs. 
Table 3 below shows rain delay matrix. “1” represent a rainfall day, “0” represent 
no rainfall. It is assumed there is no correlation between the site location and the rainfall 
in a vicinity.  
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Table 3 
Rain Delays for Week One 
Day 
Site 
One Two Three Four Five Six 
Monday 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Tuesday 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Wednesday 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Thursday 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Friday 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Saturday 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
Jobsite Locations 
Van Vleet (2004) has selected six jobsite locations, namely, Brookside Village, 
Piney Point Village, Highlands, Jersey Village, Bunker Hill Village and Richmond. 
Table 4 indicates all the delivery and travel costs from the jobsite to owner’s office 
which located at Sugar Land, Texas.  
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Table 4 
Location of the Construction Sites in Houston 
Site # 
Location of 
Development 
Distance from 
Sugarland (Km) 
Travel Cost 
($) 
Delivery 
Cost ($) 
Total Cost 
($) 
Site 1 
Brookside 
Village 
67.6 858 624 1482 
Site 2 
Piney Point 
Village 
38.6 495 360 855 
Site 3 Highlands 112.6 1452 1056 2508 
Site 4 Jersey Village 64.37 825 600 1425 
Site 5 
Bunker Hill 
Village 
43.45 561 408 969 
Site 6 Richmond 22.53 297 216 513 
 
 
 
Figure 3 indicates the jobsite locations.  
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Figure 3 Job Site Locations 
 
 
 
Data Collection 
Wellington (2006) changed the game to Sequential Query Language (SQL) in 
order to enable efficient multiple bidding. Participants of RAB game are assigned a 
username and password. Once the bidders login to the website, they can know all 
information about the contract. For example, other bidder’s username, all current bids 
and their costs of each job is show on the main screen. 
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Once a bidder logs on to the server, the bidders can see the current bids screen as 
shown in Figure 4.  The current bids screen includes jobsite locations, the delivery and 
travel costs, approximate profit and profit percentage. In addition, there is an empty 
column named My price, by input the price number into “my price” column, and then 
click on “submit” bottom, the bidder can submit their bids.  
There are nine bidding sessions, each of the bidding session was 15 minutes. 
Between each bidding session, there were 5 minutes breaks. Bidders were only able to 
submit their bids during the bidding session.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Current Bid Screen From RAB Website 
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Each bidder can only bid on three jobs within a given week. If the bidders want 
to bid on more jobs, they can take a loan from the bank. The charge for each loan was 
$500, which will be automatically deducted from their account.  
Figure 5 below indicates the bank loan form. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Bank Loan Form 
 
 
 
Since in an RAB game, the bidders were only allowed to provide a price, which 
is lower than the current lowest bid. If the bidder submits a bid, which is higher than the 
current lowest bid, the following notification will appear on their screen (See Figure 6). 
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Figure 6 Higher Than Current Lowest Bid Statement 
 
 
 
The bid will be awarded to the lowest bidder at the end of each 15-minute bid 
session. The bidders were able to go to the “my jobs in progress” website (see Figure 7) 
to view what jobs did they win.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 My Bid Information Web Page 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodology utilized to analysis the bid data. By 
observing the time data collected from previous Reverse Auction Bidding games 
conducted in TAMU, the research determined that human bidders bid time interval is 
approximately 2 second. This chapter describes the data analysis process, including the 
data sources and data reorganization.  
Data Source 
Since Van Vleet developed the RAB game from 2004, 25 case studies were 
conducted in TAMU. This research is the 26th case study of Reverse Auction Bidding. 
The research data were collected from previous RAB research experiments.  
The participants of RAB game were construction science students and 
construction professions. All of the participants have the same level of knowledge about 
RAB game. In addition, the participants played the role of contractors, who compete 
against each other by reducing their bid prices. Each game has the maximum of 9 
sections, and each section has 15 minutes. In addition, in between of two sections, there 
was 5 minute breaks. During the 15 minutes’ bidding time, the bidders can submit their 
bids at any time, as long as their bid’s price is lower than the current lowest price. At the 
end of each game, the jobs were awarded to the lowest bidders.  
W. Kim (2004) created the online RAB system, Wellington (2006) recreated the 
system with SQL Server. All the RAB game data are collected and then transferred to 
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Microsoft Access, which include the bid ID, Job ID, Control ID, bid prices and bid time. 
7 sets of data to analyze the bid time intervals.  
Table 5 gives an example of bid information contained in a typical Microsoft 
Access database. 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Original Access Dataset Sample 1 
bidID jobID ctrID bidAmount bidDate bidTime 
5 1 4 $12,999.00  1 7:01:02 PM 
19 1 4 $12,400.00  1 7:02:21 PM 
88 1 4 $12,150.00  1 7:11:48 PM 
105 1 7 $12,149.00  1 7:13:27 PM 
2 1 8 $13,000.00  1 7:00:22 PM 
11 1 8 $12,500.00  1 7:01:39 PM 
22 1 8 $12,200.00  1 7:02:52 PM 
1 1 9 $15,000.00  1 7:00:20 PM 
115 1 9 $12,000.00  1 7:14:16 PM 
62 2 4 $12,999.00  1 7:09:30 PM 
89 2 4 $12,450.00  1 7:11:52 PM 
95 2 4 $12,200.00  1 7:12:22 PM 
104 2 4 $12,100.00  1 7:13:20 PM 
8 2 7 $13,500.00  1 7:01:29 PM 
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Table 6 gives an example of job information collected in the database. 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Original Access Dataset Sample 2 
jobID siteID jobPrice ctrID jobBidStartTime jobBidEndTime 
1 6 12000 9 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
2 5 12100 4 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
3 5 11999 7 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
4 5 12000 9 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
5 6 11750 8 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
6 4 11999 7 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
7 3 12300 9 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
8 4 11999 4 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
9 3 12499 7 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
10 1 12300 8 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
11 1 12000 9 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
12 1 12300 8 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
13 2 10900 6 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
14 4 12000 4 5/4/04 7:20 PM 5/4/04 7:35 PM 
15 4 12450 4 5/4/04 7:20 PM 5/4/04 7:35 PM 
 
 
 
Data Reorganization 
The research utilized 7 sets of data. For each set of data, the research categorized 
the bids by their bidding sections, each section has 15 minutes which the bidders can 
submit their bids.  
The key characteristics of the data set are: 
 A count of number of bidders yields 59. 
 A count of the number of experiments yields seven. 
 A count of the number of bidding sections yields 54. 
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 A count of the number of projects yields 480.
 A count of the number of bids yields 4614 valid bids
Table 7 indicates a summary of bid and record data for the 7 case studies. 
Table 7 
Bid and Record Data Summary 
Experiment 
Date 
Case 
Study ID 
Number of 
Contractors 
Number of 
Section 
Number of 
Projects 
Number of 
Bids 
5/4/2004 1 5 9 86 744 
11/5/2007 4 4 4 43 334 
4/6/2010 5 5 8 54 805 
4/3/2010 6 5 4 58 284 
6/11/2010 9 4 9 59 904 
6/08/2010 11 4 9 107 839 
09/21/2010 15 5 9 73 704 
Total 59 54 480 4614 
Bidding Segment Definition 
Each bidding section includes 15 minutes bidding time, this research has divided 
each bidding sections into 2 categories or segments to provide for a time difference 
analysis. Bidding section segment 1 includes all the bid information obtained from 1 
37 
seconds to 7 minutes and 30 seconds. Bidding section segment 2 include all the bid 
information obtained from 7 minutes 31 seconds to 15 seconds. 
In each 15 minutes’ bidding section, the data has been divided into two segments 
by the bids arrival time, namely, segment 1 and segment 2. Segment 1 contains all the 
bids from the first second to 7 minutes 30 seconds, which is half time of a bidding 
section. Segment 2 contains all the bids received from 7 minutes 30 seconds to 15 
minutes. 
The reorganized data sets are named as the case study 1-section 1-segment 1, 
case study 1-section 1-segment 2 and so on. 
The Figure 8 indicates how the data were divided. 
Figure 8 Data Reorganization Schematic 
The key characteristics of the data set are: 
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i. A count of number of bidding sections is 54.
ii. A count of number of bidding segment is 108.
The last step of data reorganization is to recombine each case study’s segment 1 
data into one dataset, and to recombine the segment 2 data into another dataset. To name 
them as the case study 1-accumulated segment 1 data, case study 2-accumulated segment 
2. 
The Figure 9  indicates the accumulated data segment of each case studies. 
Figure 9 Accumulated Data Segment 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the analysis of the data and the results of the research. 
This chapter summaries single segment data analysis, accumulated segment data 
analysis, the special case, bid time-intervals comparison and summary. 
Single Segment Data Analysis 
The point of the study is to look at the distribution of the time intervals between 
the bids. The single segment data analysis uses a histogram figure and linear regression 
analysis. A typical bidding interval time breakdown is shown on Figure 10, which is the 
histogram result of case study 9-section 1-segment 1. The most bids time intervals are 
within 5 seconds. 
Figure 10 Bids time-intervals When Time Interval is 10 Seconds of case study 9 section 
1 segment 1 
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However, there time-intervals are appeared after 5 seconds, which means, most 
of the people bidding within 5 seconds after a new lowest bid has appeared on their 
screen. The research has analyzed the bid time-intervals of all the case studies. 
Figure 11 Bids time-intervals When Time Interval is 1 Seconds of case study 9 section 1 
segment 1 
Figure 11 shows there are more bids time-intervals located within 5 seconds. 
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Figure 12 Bids time-intervals When Time Interval is 2 Seconds of case study 9 section 1 
segment 1 
Figure 12 shows when the time-axle is 2 seconds, the most bids time-intervals 
are located within 5 seconds, fewer bids time-intervals are observed after 5 seconds. 
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Figure 13 Bids time-intervals When Time Interval is 3 Seconds of case study 9 section 1 
segment 1 
Figure 13 shows when the time-axle is 3 seconds, then most bids time intervals 
are located within 10 seconds. 
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Figure 14 Bids time-intervals When Time Interval is 10 Seconds of case study 9 section 
1 segment 2 
Figure 14 is the histogram result of case study 9-section 1-segment 2. Most bids 
time intervals are within 10 seconds. 
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Figure 15 Bids time-intervals When Time Interval is 1 Seconds of case study 9 section 1 
segment 2 
 
 
 
Figure 15 is the histogram result of case study 9-section 1-segment 2 where the 
time-axle is 2 seconds. The most bids time intervals are within 1 seconds. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 Bids time-intervals When Time Interval is 2 Seconds of case study 9 section 1 
segment 2 
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Figure 16 is the histogram result of case study 9-section 1-segment 2 where the 
time-axle is 2 seconds. Most bids time intervals are within 8 seconds. 
Figure 17 Bids time-intervals When Time Interval is 3 Seconds of case study 9 section 1 
segment 2 
Figure 16 is the histogram result of case study 9-section 1-segment 2 where the 
time-axle is 3 seconds. Most bids time intervals are within 12 seconds. 
Further, the research compared the bid time-intervals in segment 1 and segment 2 
of case study 9-section 1 by adopting a linear regression analysis. Figure 18 shows the 
comparison of the results. 
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Figure 18 10 seconds bids time-intervals Comparison of Segment 1 and Segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 1  
 
 
 
Figure 18 shows a high volume of bid time-intervals are located within ten 
seconds. However, after 10 seconds, segment 2 experiences a sharp drop of time-
intervals. Segment 1 indicates most of the bid time-intervals are located in 10 seconds, 
there is a fewer bids time-intervals are located at 20 seconds. However, with the bidding 
process ongoing, there is fewer bid time-intervals appeared after 1 minutes and 10 
seconds. 
The bid time-intervals do not only represent the time difference, but also reflect 
the bids quantities. As we know, one bids time interval can represent 2 bids because we 
used one bid arrival time to subtract another bid arrival time. Therefore, in the graph, 
where a crest can represent a high volume of bids have received at that moment. By 
reviewing the data, it is believed there are more bids have been received within the 
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segment 2. Bidders submit more bids when the time goes towards the end of each 
section. 
Since Figure 18 shows a smooth linear regression of the bids time-intervals of 
both segment 1 and segment 2. So that it is believed that 10 seconds is a relatively long 
time for the human bidders to react in a RAB game. The research further repeated the 
two steps as described above for the same set of data. However, the x-axes was reset as 1 
seconds interval. The comparison of bids time-intervals in segment 1 and segment 2.  
When the time interval is 1 seconds is shown as Figure 19. 
Figure 19 1 seconds bids time-intervals Comparison of Segment 1 and Segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 1  
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Figure 20 shows the fluctuation of bids time-intervals for both segment 1 and 
segment 2 are obvious. In between the two adjacent crests, where a high volume number 
of bids have received, there is a two seconds interval corresponding to each of the crests. 
It is likely the human bidder’s reaction time is a minimum effective two second in an 
RAB game.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 20 2 seconds bids time-intervals Comparison of Segment 1 and Segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 1  
 
 
 
Figure 20 shows when the bids time-intervals are 2 seconds, the distribution of 
bids time-intervals smooth out.  
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Figure 21 shows, when the bids time-intervals are 3 seconds, the linear 
regression distribution is more close to curved lines. 
Figure 21 3 seconds bids time-intervals Comparison of Segment 1 and Segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 1  
The research compared all the selected dataset separately by conduct the same 
test for 54 bidding sections. Ninety percent of the data shows the same figure shape as 
the result above. Additional examples of single segment analysis are given in the 
Appendix A. 
Accumulated Segment Data Analysis 
The research has further tested the accumulated datasets by using the same 
statistic technics as introduced above, to ensure the result is a universal character for all 
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the data.  All the figures show very similar results as single segment data analysis. The 
figures below, Figure 22, Figure 23, Figure 24 and Figure 25, show the test results. 
Figure 22 10 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of accumulated segment 1 and 
segment 2 of case study 9 
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Figure 23 1 seconds bids time-intervals Comparison of accumulated Segment 1 and 
Segment 2 of case study 9  
Figure 24 2 seconds bids time-intervals Comparison of accumulated Segment 1 and 
Segment 2 of case study 9  
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Figure 25 3 seconds bids time-intervals Comparison of accumulated Segment 1 and 
Segment 2 of case study 9  
Both the single segment data and the accumulated data analysis indicate the same 
characteristics of the bid time-intervals. Smooth linear regression graphs result when the 
time intervals are 2 seconds, 3 seconds, and 10 seconds. When the x-axle are united with 
1 seconds, the bids time-intervals appears an obvious fluctuation. 
Special Case 
Although 90% of the figures indicate very similar results when compare segment 
1 bids time-intervals and segment 2 bids time-intervals in different time axes, the special 
cases exist in the data. The research cannot get a smooth bid time-intervals distribution 
when the time axes unite are 2 seconds and 3 seconds(see Figure 26 and Figure 27). In 
other words, when the time intervals are enlarged to 2 seconds and 3 seconds, an obvious 
crest and valley exists in the figures. The research observed these special sections. 
Moreover, all the sections received a significant smaller volume of bids. In these 
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sections, the bidders intended to bid less aggressive. Therefore, that a few bid were 
recorded in the server. The reason behind this phenomenon needs to be further analyzed. 
Figure 26 2 seconds bids time-intervals Comparison of Segment 1 and Segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 5 
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Figure 27 3 seconds bids time-intervals Comparison of Segment 1 and Segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 5  
Bid Time-intervals Comparison 
In segment 1, 90% of the bids time-intervals are located within 23 seconds. In 
segment 2, 90% of the bids time-intervals are located within 9 seconds. 
This result can generate 2 bidding rules. 
When the machine is bidding during segment 1, it should randomly select a time 
interval from 2 seconds to 23 seconds to bid against the human bidders. 
When the machine is bidding during the segment 2, it should randomly select a 
time-interval from 2 seconds to 9 seconds. 
Summary 
The research has compared the figures resulted from single segment data analysis 
and the accumulated data analysis; it is believed the data has the same characteristics. 
All the data gives a smooth linear regression when the time intervals are 2 seconds, 3 
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seconds and 10 seconds. However, when the time intervals is 1 seconds, the data have an 
obvious fluctuate in both segment 1 and segment 2. Further, in between the data crest, 
there is 2 second-time intervals.  
In addition, two rules can be applied to the computer bidder machine, rule 1 is 
appropriate when the computer is bidding during the segment 1. The computer machine 
should randomly select a bid time-interval from 2 seconds to 23 seconds. Rule 2 is 
suitable for segment 2. The computer machine should select a bid time-interval from 2 
seconds to 9 seconds.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research is the 26th case study of Reverse Auction Bidding in Texas A&M 
University. The research further analyzed the human being’s behavior in a Reverse 
Auction Bidding. Based on the analysis of the data collected from previous RAB 
experiments, the research find there are two rules can be adopted for the computer bidder 
machine. 
When the computer bidder machine is bidding during the first half of sections, 
which starts from 0 seconds to 450 seconds, the machine shall randomly select bid time 
intervals from2 seconds to 23 seconds.  
When the computer bidder machine is bidding during the second half of sections, 
which starts from 450 seconds to 900 seconds, the machine shall select bid time intervals 
from 2 seconds to 9 seconds.  
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APPENDIX A 
SINGLE SEGMENT DATA ANALYSIS 
The following figures are the results of linear regression analysis of case study 9 
section 2, section 3, section 4, section 5 and section 6.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 28 10 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 2 
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Figure 29 1 seconds Bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 2  
 
 
 
 
Figure 30 2 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 2  
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Figure 31 3 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32 10 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 3  
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Figure 33 1 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 3  
 
 
 
Figure 34 2 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 3 
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Figure 35 3 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 3 
 
 
 
Figure 36 10 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 4 
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Figure 37 1 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 4 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38 2 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 4 
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Figure 39 3 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 4 
 
 
 
Figure 40 10 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 5 
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Figure 41 1 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 5  
 
 
 
Figure 42 2 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 5 
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Figure 43 3 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 5 
 
 
 
Figure 44 10 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 6 
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Figure 45 1 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 6 
 
 
 
Figure 46 2 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 6 
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Figure 47 10 seconds bids Time-intervals comparison of segment 1 and segment 2 of 
case study 9 section 6 
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